Super perhaps not so super
No Sally man for 2 Cav in MEAO
Straight shooting over drills
A SAD state of affairs

 

Super perhaps not so super

THE pay and allowance structure for ORs will change from August 9 with an increase in the number of pay groups from seven to 16.
A problem seems to have appeared with the event of rolling in various allowances (SAFA, Diving, Flying, other) into our pay.

The idea (and a good one I might add) is to increase our final average salary (FAS) for the purpose of super when we retire or to determine the yearly amount paid by Comsuper for an A Class or B Class pension if we are unfortunate enough to be medically discharged.

If a member is injured during the course of their duties to a point that they can no longer carry out their specialist duties, but continues to be employed by the Army in some other role, the member will not be disadvantaged by losing their allowance as MSBS or Vet Affairs will supplement their specialist pay loss if approved, whilst they continue to serve.

Now I know what you’re thinking here, but you’re sensible.

Yes, the big problem arises as these entitlements (paid for by a different Government agency) are now not accounted for at all when calculating for super or pension purposes like everyone else.

This will leave a member thousands of dollars a year out of pocket.

Will I need to fall off my bike at parliament house to compensate for the loss?

Contact with various government agencies to gain information or a determination have to date been futile as all have stated that this problem is beyond them.

Members in this situation have missed a year of allowances for their super already as these allowances were rolled in for super purposes over a year ago if I am not mistaken.

Would someone be able to inform myself and numerous others in all three services, as to why (of all things) our pension should be decreased by thousands of dollars a year due to injuries obtained in the service of our country.
Sgt Errol Dooley
5 Avn Regt
Townsville

 

No Sally man for 2 Cav in MEAO

IT was brought to my attention that the powers-that-be decided that 2 Cav Regt ’s Sallyman would not be deploying with them to the MEAO.

The alleged rationale for this omission was that the US Army had set up all the amenities required and the Sallyman would be superfluous.

If this is indeed the case, then the entire raison d’etre of the Sallyman has been lost.

I have had the honour and privilege of working with the Sallyman on deployment to Timor-Leste on Op Astute.

I have also had the misfortune of having been on a few more operational deployments without a Sallyman. The differences were stark and palpable.

The Sallyman is not just a repository for biscuits, a brew and Jubie juice.

He is a shoulder that many soldiers seem to cry on, a compassionate soul to speak to without being judged and he makes for a potent welfare team when judiciously combined with the padre.

Yes, we have psychologists and other mental health professionals.

I dare you to ask them if they know Smithy from pioneers, and they will look at you blankly.

It’s the Sallyman who just happens to know that Smithy is going through a hard time, because they happened to have a chat over a cups canteen full of Jubie.

I have noticed a recent trend that has seen the Sallyman lose his uniform privileges, being excluded from certain Army commands and now being excluded from doing his very important work during operations.

Now more than ever before commanders need all the help they can get; let’s not make another myopic decision that will be hard to undo.

Five facts that you might not have known about the Sallyman:

  • 1. His services, including truck and refreshments are fully paid for by the Salvation Army.
  • 2. He gets paid $5.10 a day in allowances while on operations (active or non-warlike service)
  • 3. He is entitled to receive field allowance from the ADF, however, he cannot accept this and the monies are paid to the Salvation Army.
  • 4. He is no longer entitled to wear the DPCU/DPDU uniform, however, he can wear ceremonial polyesters.
  • 5. He is entitled to and is awarded all the ADF medals.

Maj Jerome Reid
3RAR
Holsworthy Barracks


Maj Steve Frankel, Preparedness and Plans AHQ, replies:
The Sallyman provides a valuable service to units. When 2 Cav Regt deployed to the MEAO as AMTG I, they did not take a Sallyman.
However, the CO was restricted by a manning cap and had to make some difficult choices regarding which capabilities he would deploy.

The short timeframe before the deployment and a number of uncertainties regarding the mission made the decision even more difficult.

However, the decision to deploy without a Sallyman was not taken lightly.

The CO had undertaken a reconnaissance and identified that the amenities within Camp Smitty (provided by UK elements) would have been duplicated by a Sallyman.

Additionally, the threat level in the Area of Operations precluded the Sallyman from operating effectively.

The CO did appreciate the other welfare benefits provided by the Sallyman but took the decision that these could be provided by a padre and a doctor which were deployed as part of AMTG I.

The manning for operations is reviewed regularly to identify and address any deficiencies. The Sallyman certainly provides a valuable function within units.

However, operational constraints often require commanders to make tough decisions regarding which capabilities will deploy.

 

Straight shooting over drills

IN regards to the recent change in 9mm drills which have been implemented into my unit in the MEAO, I have a question: if it’s not broken why try to fix it?

The drills that soldiers have been doing with the Browning automatic have been done that way since who knows when, but I’m sure that it was since the weapon was brought into service, a real long time ago.

To unnecessarily complicate things with a new IA drill flies in the face of what an IA is all about, which is getting the weapon back up and working so that you can continue the engagement.

Further to this point something else that has been implemented into the new drill with little regard to the consequences, is how is a left handed firer (yes I’m a lefty) supposed to comfortably tilt right prior to tapping the magazine?

Give it a try; it looks as uncomfortable as it feels.

On the mound or on operations, an uncomfortable operator is more prone to mistakes, I urge that the powers that be look into this more closely before it is too late.
Tpr Linton Harris
Combat Team Eagle
OBG(W) 2

Colonel Mark Holmes, Commandant CATC (OHS Adviser ADF Small Arms Training and Training Adviser ADF Small Arms) replies:
TPR Harris has raised a number of issues in his letter on the drills for the Self-loading pistol 9mm Mk3.

I am pleased to be informed of small arms weapon training and handling issues as this enables us to better support operational readiness and deployed personnel.

There are a number of changes to the drills detailed in the newly released weapon publication, LWP-G 7-4-1. A number of these are the result of the magazine safety being removed from the pistol, thus enabling the action to be fired without the need to fit a magazine to the weapon.

The statement that there has been a change to the IA is incorrect.

The IA drill in the new publication is unchanged from that detailed in LWP-G 7-4-11, The Self-loading Pistol 9mm L9A1, issued in 1998.

If personnel are conducting a different IA drill, then it is incorrect and has been for nine years.

The stoppage drill, however, has changed.

It has been changed to a single drill which, if carried out in accordance with the procedure detailed, will rectify all of the stoppages that previously required three different procedures to rectify.

It allows the operator to concentrate on the threat area and not have to try and work out which stoppage has occurred before making a decision as to the appropriate action needed to rectify the stoppage.

It also eliminates the need for the operator to have to look at the pistol to determine the problem, which can be extremely difficult in low light conditions.

The second issue of being a ‘lefty’ and therefore finding it difficult to conduct the ‘new’ drill, would have been easily remedied had the instructor teaching the drills referred to the appropriate publication prior to the training.

Para 1.15 reads:
“Left-handed Operators. The service pistol may be fired using the right hand or the left hand.
“Where the procedures and techniques are unaffected by which hand is used, the terminology will be ‘master hand’ for the hand controlling the pistol and ‘non-master’ for the hand providing support.

“Where the use of the left hand will impact on the procedures and techniques, specific detail will be included.

“It is important that the instructor recognise that there are differences in the operation of the pistol between left-handed and right-handed operators and instruct each operator appropriately.”

It is essential that instructors adhere to the doctrine contained in the relevant publications when preparing for and conducting weapons training to ensure that personnel are taught correctly and safely.

 
A SAD state of affairs

LAST year AHQ made a decision to change all Ships’ Army Departments (SADs) of HMA Ships Kanimbla, Manoora and Tobruk from LHQ (independent units) to come under the SED of 10FSB in January 2007. This change of command has caused a number of ripples, which are getting larger.

On 10FSB assuming command, the position of the OC for HMAS Kanimbla was APEPed for 2008 and consequently AHQ in their wisdom APEPed the remaining two OC positions on Manoora and Tobruk, disregarding the objections of HQJOC and Fleet HQ.

This means that in 2008 the SAD HMAS Kanimbla loses their OC for good, and the other OC positions will go when their tenure ceases in 2009.

The actions of AHQ in a sense have gutted the amphibious fleet of the required command structure to do its tasks.

The SAD’s are an important part of the amphibious fleet as they are on short notice to deploy and are always the first to be recalled to prepare and load the ships before departure.

HMAS Kanimbla has deployed on four operations in less than two years. Often enough the SAD’s are undermanned and always sail without the required crew.

In times of need 30 Tml Sqn is called upon to fill the gaps, even though its numbers are low at the best of times.

The administration for the SAD’s has also suffered. In the past the basic admin was done by HQ 9FSB (Sydney) where all ships are alongside, and the rest was completed by the ship.

Now all admin is conducted by 10FSB in Townsville and, because of the distance, this has led to problems, ie: posting dates onto the ships have been changed to suit only 10FSB (30 Tml Sqn); PMKeyS will not allow downloads of our unit ID for AIRN (I have been told this will not be fixed); all leave applications have to be sent and processed in Townsville (where leave records are kept); group certificates are sent to Townsville; PAC letters sent to Townsville; and course panels have been sent to 10FSB and not forwarded on to the SADs.

A solution to this problem has been raised, but not acted upon by higher command (HQ 17 CSS Bde and 10FSB) that an administrative cell be set up at Garden Island in Sydney.

This detachment would become our HQ for all SAD’s and would consist of the following: a captain, a sergeant cargo, a sergeant op mov, a corporal clerk admin and a cargo section. This detachment would in essence become a pool of personnel for all SAD’s when it comes to manning shortfalls, course absences and leave.

If the Army was serious about the HNA, it would have this detachment raised sooner than later to ensure that all SAD personnel are administered correctly and without disadvantage.
Sgt Sean Lehmann
HMAS Kanimbla
Garden Island


Lt-Col Mark Coyle, SO1 Force Structure (Organisation) AHQ, replies:
In response to the specific questions raised by Sgt Lehmann, while the three SADs were direct command units of LHQ, they were actually under the administrative command of 9FSB.

The SAD themselves identified that this was not an ideal arrangement and it was agreed, by the UE Review team, that they would be better structured under the command of 10FSB.

This also makes sense, given the impending move of 9FSB to Amberley and the fact that 30 Terminal Squadron within 10FSB is also a like unit with respect to trade. If Sgt Lehmann feels that he is being administratively neglected by the new command structure I would suggest that it is an issue of process, not structural incorrectness. A quick check on PMKeyS also shows that it is possible to download the units AIRN status.

With respect to the Army Personnel Establishment Plan (APEP), it is very important to understand the pressures on Army regarding personnel manning. Army, like the other two Services, currently maintains a large asset-liability gap.

We manage this capability shortfall by mitigation – namely utilising the APEP process. Like the UE Review, all levels of command are involved and the best solution is sought. With respect to the three SAD, Sgt Lehmann is correct in that the OC SAD position on HMAS Kanimbla has been made an Agreed Vacancy (AV) for 2008.

This has been mitigated by HQ 17 CSS Bde by ensuring that a senior Captain, who is fully qualified as the OC, is posted to the ship and by ‘shadow posting’ a Major, should the need arise.

However, the comment made by Sgt Lehmann regarding the other two OC SAD positions is incorrect. The OC SAD positions for HMAS Manoora and Tobruk will not be made AV in 2008. Instead, two Majors will be posted to these positions from January 2008.
Sgt Lehmann has identified a possible solution to the perceived problem of SAD administration by the raising of an admin cell at Garden Island.

Although these positions could act as the administrative hub for the SAD and provide a ‘reserve pool’ for the three SAD, I would reiterate my comments about personnel manning pressures within Army.

Creating a reserve of positions to cover manning shortfalls, course absences and leave is simply not practical nor achievable in the current climate.

If Army could spare the people to fill this function, it would simply post them to the SAD to ensure they were fully manned. All units within Army are affected by external influences like courses and leave and it is the responsibility of the chain of command (including both Officers and SNCO) to manage.

The administrative responsibilities of the cell should be effectively conducted by 10FSB. If this is an issue, I would infer that this is, again, a process issue and one that I am sure CO 10FSB would be very concerned about.